Procreating from Prison: Evaluating British Prisoners\u27 Right to Artificially Inseminate Their Wives Under the United Kingdom\u27s New Human Rights Act and the 2001 Mellor Case by Proctor, PollyBeth
PROCREATING FROM PRISON: EVALUATING BRITISH PRISONERS' RIGHT TO
ARTIFICIALLY INSEMINATE THEIR WIVES UNDER THE UNITED KINGDOM'S NEW
HUMAN RIGHTS ACT AND THE 2001 MELLOR CASE
PollyBeth Proctor*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................... 460
I. BACKGROUND .......................................... 464
A. The United Kingdom's Human Rights History .............. 464
B. The Human Rights Act ................................ 466
1. Impetusfor the Act ................................. 466
2. The Act's Principal Provisions ....................... 467
3. Projected Impact of Prisoners' Claims in HRA Litigation .. 470
C. Prisoners' Historical Requests for Artificial Insemination .... 471
I1H. THE MELLOR CASE ...................................... 473
A. Consideration of Societal Values and the ECHR ............ 474
B. Application of Domestic Legal Principles under ECHR ...... 475
C. Application of ECHR Articles in Mellor ................... 475
IV. ANALYSIS ............................................. 477
A. Should Conjugal Visits Be Revisited? ..................... 478
B. Convention Articles Considered ......................... 479
1. A rticle 12 ........................................ 479
2. Article 8 and Proportionality ........................ 481
C. Does The United Kingdom have an Affirmative Duty to
Promote Private and Family Life? ....................... 484
V. APPROACHES TO PROCREATIVE FREEDOMS FOR PRISONERS:
THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES COMPARED .... 486
VI. CONCLUSION ........................................... 490
* J.D. 2003, University of Georgia; B.A. 1999, Davidson College.
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, the legal communities in both the United Kingdom
and the United States have been engaging in heated debates about a prisoner's
right to procreate. It is not conjugal visits, which are generally prohibited in
both countries,' but rather the prisoner's right to access facilities for artificial
insemination (Al) that have taken center stage. The idea that a man serving a
life sentence might have a right to artificially inseminate his wife so that he can
father a child while behind bars provokes strong and opposing reactions from
members of these legal communities.
In two United States cases, appeals courts employed strict constitutional
analyses in addressing this issue. In 1990, the 8th Circuit addressed the issue,2
and the 9th Circuit addressed the issue again in 200 . While these U.S. cases
provide insights into the issue at hand, and while this Note will survey them
in consideration of the English judicial approach to the same matter, it will
focus primarily on the development of the prisoner's right to procreate in the
United Kingdom.
The discourse that surrounds the debates in the United Kingdom is
particularly engaging because of the many competing interests that emerge.
Constitutional rights, human rights, penological objectives, public policy, and
family issues like privacy and marriage must all be evaluated.4 The English
' See 60 AM. JURL 2D, Penal and Correctional Institutions § 84 at "Conjugal Visits" (1987)
(stating that prisoners in the United States traditionally have been denied opportunities for
conjugal, overnight familial visits while incarcerated; while some states now allow some form
of conjugal or extended family visitation, the general practice is still not to permit such contact);
see also infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text for the status of conjugal visits in the United
Kingdom
' Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1990). Without determining whether the
right to procreate survives incarceration, the court states instead that the policy behind the
restriction is reasonably related to the penological interest of equal treatment of men and women
(since prisons could never practically support female inmates' pregnancies). See id. at 1399-
1400.
' Gerber v. Hickman, 264 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'den banc, 291 F.3d 617 (9th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 558 (2002). The 2001 court found the right to procreate does
survive incarceration and that the prohibitive policy did not further any legitimate penological
objectives. The 2002 court reversed the decision, precluding the right for prisoners to procreate
via Al under a similar analysis, weighing penological objectives against the individual right.
4 See generally HELEEN BOSMA, FREEDOM OF ExPRESsIoN IN ENGLAND AND UNDER THE
ECHR: IN SEARCHOFACOMMON GROUND (2000) [hereinafter BOSMA]; HUMAN RIGHTS FORTHE
NEW MULENNIUM (Frances Butler ed., 2000) [hereinafter Butler]; THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT
1998: WHAT IT MEANs (Lammy Betten ed., 1999) [hereinafter Betten]. See also R. v. Sec'y for
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courts must prioritize these obligations, a duty which has assumed unprece-
dented importance in recent years, as the country undergoes what some
scholars have speculated to be a peaceful constitutional revolution.'
In November of 1998, the United Kingdom officially incorporated the
European Convention on Human Rights' (ECHR) through the Human Rights
Act7 (-RA), which became effective in October of 2000.8 The Convention,
which sets forth a number of fundamental rights and freedoms, guarantees
citizens of Member States a forum in which to secure these rights.9 While
most other Member States had entrenched the Convention's human rights law
securely in their legal systems, the United Kingdom remained one of only three
States who had not."° Thus, until only recently, Convention law carried only
persuasive authority in English national courts." The Act is therefore a
powerful piece of legislation that aims to integrate the common law system of
human rights with the continental system of Convention law.' 2 The Act gives
courts a new power of statutory interpretation that shares features of the
judicial review function of the U.S. Supreme Court," and yet allows the
the Home Dep't, exparte Mellor, [2001] H.R.L.R. 38, available at 2001 WL 272920. This is
the only case in England after the passage of the Human Rights Act in which a prisoner asserted
his right to artificially inseminate his wife; the House of Lords' very lengthy opinion discusses
prison policy, domestic law, European Convention on Human Rights law and other societal
concerns before denying the request. See id.
' Ian Loveland, Incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights into UK Law,
52 PARL AFFAIRS 113, 117 (1999). Loveland argues that judges and politicians interpret the
Human Rights Act to assume supra-legislative status;judges envision the ECHR as offering them
a" 'side door' approach to using Convention principles to disapply acts of Parliament which
contravene its requirements." Id. at 117.
6 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force 3 June, 1953 after
ratification by eight states) [hereinafter ECHR].
Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.).
BOSMA, supra note 4, at 3.
9 See generally Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, at http://conventions.coe. intlTreaty/en/Summaries/Html/005.htm (listing all rights
protected by the Convention and providing abrief summary of Convention operation today) (last
visited Oct. 11, 2001).
'0 Loveland, supra note 5, at 114 (naming Norway and Ireland as the other two).
" Id. The Convention itself does not require incorporation by the signatory states into their
domestic law, and English courts have been therefore unable to invoke its provisions to override
parliamentary legislation or other governmental decisions that violate Convention terms. Id.
12 BOSMA, supra note 4, at 3.
"3 Lord Irvine of Lairg, Activism andRestraint: Human Rights and the Interpretive Process,
in HUMANRiGHTSFORTHENEWMLLENNIUM4-7 (Frances Butler ed., 2000) (suggesting that the
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United Kingdom to retain elements of parliamentary sovereignty that have
always characterized its government."
One area of law that has attracted significant attention since the Act became
effective is prisoners' rights." British prisoners have generally been denied
the right to procreate by Al except in exceptional medical circumstances,
although the policy has been applied with some inconsistency. 6 Prisoners
consistently base their claims on ECHR Article 8, the Right to Respect for
Family Life, and Article 12, the Right to Found a Family; yet neither the
English courts nor the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg have
found a violation where the right to procreate was at issue. 7 The limited and
inconsistent national and international case law on this subject only renders
supposition about the future of these prisoner claims in light of novel human
rights legislation even more speculative; this Note will seek guidance from the
one case that has considered the issue in the United Kingdom since the passage
of the HRA.
In a timely response to the Act, British inmate Gavin Mellor sued the
British Secretary of State in 2000 alleging a breach of his guaranteed
fundamental rights when his request to artificially inseminate his wife was
denied.' The case was brought before the Act's incorporation of the ECHR,
extent to which English judges will guard fundamental rights under the newAct will reflect their
willingness to ensure governmental accountability, much like U.S. Supreme Court's role as set
out in the landmark case of Marbury v. Madison, (5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137,2 L. Ed. 60 (1803)).
"' See generally BOSMA, supra note 4, at ch. 1.1.3 (relating a clear and concise description
on the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty).
" See Michael Clarke, Prisoners Will Be Suing for Fresh Air Next Says Jail Chief, DAILY
MAIL, Sept. 6, 2000, at 13 (quoting Chief Inspector of Prisons who warns that "prisoners are
planning to unleash a tidal wave of lawsuits"); see also Frank Michael, Caught in the Act,
GUARDIAN, May 10, 2000, at 1 ("[P]risoners and their lawyers are preparing to challenge prison
service policies and practices across the board.").
" See, e.g., P.G. v. United Kingdom, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc (App. No.
10822/84 (1987)). The prison had voluntarily granted the request for AI when the prisoner's
wife developed pre-cancer abnormalities of the cervix and medical doctors urged immediate
conception. The Strasbourg Court admitted the prisoner's wife's claim for AI but subsequently
dismissed it when applicant did not indicate intent to maintain application for facilities. Id. But
see I. & W.J. v. United Kingdom, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc (App. No.
20004/92 (1993)) (citing prison's denial of prisoner's request after a twenty two-month delay
even though wife had severe gynecological problems necessitating medical assistance for
conception); G.S. & R.S. v. United Kingdom, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc (App.
No. 17142/90 (1991)) (stating that the Prison Service granted the request only once the claim
was filed against them in Strasbourg).
17 See id; see also discussion infra Part Bl.C.
S See R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, exparte Mellor, [2000] H.R.L.R. 846 at
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and the denial of the prisoner's request was upheld. 9 Mellor appealed in April
of 2001, after the Act's incorporation, and denial was again upheld.20
Although the Court considered national prison policy and domestic precedent
in its reasoning, it also expressly recognized its new obligations under the
Human Rights Act. Did the Mellor case sound the death-knell for hopes that
the new Act would bring procreative freedom to the British prisoner at home?
Does post-incorporation Convention compliance even require recognition of
such a right?
This Note will consider how the prisoner's right to procreate will develop
in light of the United Kingdom's passage of the Human Rights Act. It will first
survey the United Kingdom's human rights history. The Note will then trace
the passage of the Human Rights Act and describe its provisions. It will then
examine the body of English law surrounding the prisoner's right to procre-
ation before the passage of the Human Rights Act.
The analysis evaluates the 2001 Mellor case under the cautious presump-
tion that a comparison of the English Courts' approach to the procreation issue
both before and after the Act's passage is indicative of the country's vision of
this right in the wake of a human rights movement. The development of these
ideas will depend on English judges' willingness to step into theirnew role and
apply what the Convention requires of them. Pursuit of more progressive
notions of human rights will be determined by the judges' perceptions of their
new interpretive role.2
The English judiciary might increasingly perceive incorporation of the
ECHR to mandate a more proactive judicial role in scrutinizing legislation or
executive actions to ensure human rights at home. Yet, it seems clear that in
the less than three years since incorporation took legal effect, the Mellor court
is announcing that granting prisoners' rights to procreate by AI is not required
for compliance with the ECHR. Close scrutiny of English jurisprudence and
societal values, as well as Convention case law and article provisions, provides
ample justification for the United Kingdom's understanding of the prisoner's
right to procreate at present. Because the ECHR affords the United Kingdom
a measure of deference in its understanding of its responsibilities under the
paras. 9, 14, available at 2000 WL 1027083.
19 See id.
" R. v. Sec'yof State for the Home Dep't, exparte Mellor, [2001] H.R.L.R. 38 at para. 69,
available at WL 272920.
"' See Loveland, supra note 5, at 124. The Act provides for the possibility of the English
judiciary shifting their traditional deference to Parliament to a higher commitment to uphold EU
laws. Id. at 124-25. See also BOSMA, supra note 4, at 32.
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Convention, the Mellor decision is arguably true to the United Kingdom's
values and legal obligations.
11. BACKGROUND
A. The United Kingdom 's Human Rights History
The United Nations' 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights22 marked
the first worldwide effort to protect and promote human rights33 The
preamble of this landmark document states that "recognition of the inherent
dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all ... is the foundation of
freedom, justice and peace in the world."' The Council of Europe responded
with its own regional commitment to human rights. On November 4, 1950, the
United Kingdom, together with eleven other countries, signed the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.25 Based on
this Convention, the twelve countries then founded the European Convention
on Human Rights, which organized civil and political rights and freedoms, as
well as a system of enforcement for the contracting states.26 The Convention
protects freedom of speech, religion and expression, privacy, the most
fundamental rights of the criminally accused, and it protects against discrimi-
nation, among other guarantees.27
Despite its commitment to sign and ratify, the United Kingdom was bound
by Convention law only at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg,
but not in its national courts, since it had not officially incorporated the
Convention into its domestic law. 28 However, ratification was an important
embrace of human rights because British citizens could still take their
" G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
EU Human Rights Policy, at http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/humanrights.htm (last
visited Mar. 9, 2003).
2 G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), at pmbl.
25 See ECHR, supra note 6; see also Ben Bradshaw, The Human Rights Bill. Progress
Through Parliament, in THE HUMANRIGHTS ACT 1998: WHAT ITMEANS 57 (LammyBetten ed.,
1999).
2 Id.
2 The European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act 1998, available
at http://www.doughtystreet.co.uk/data/ktiights/data/hr-over.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2002)
[hereinafter Human Rights Website].
28 Id. (describing the legal effect ofdomestic application of the Convention through Article
1 of the ECHR); see also Loveland, supra note 5, at 114 (describing the courts' limitations in
protecting human rights before Convention incorporation).
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allegations of human rights infringements to Strasbourg and be guaranteed a
forum for complaint there.29 Still, taking a case to an international tribunal
imposes burdensome delays and costs for the petitioner; moreover a suit can
only be filed after domestic remedies have been exhausted.30 Thus, a country's
ratification of the Convention does not promise the protections that incorpora-
tion would deliver.
Unlike the United States, the United Kingdom has no written constitution
or enumerated bill of rights. While American judges have invalidated both
national and state legislation based on constitutional principles for two
centuries,3 British judges could creatively manipulate case outcomes before
incorporation through two very limited avenues. First, through a legal
presumption, the courts assumed in their reasoning that Parliament did not
intend to restrict fundamental freedoms when it drafted the law. Second, any
ambiguities in statutory language should be construed consistently with the
ECHR.33 But since legislation cannot be overturned by British courts, then in
cases where the judge's limited interpretive freedom would not permit him to
find a Convention right violated, the plaintiff had to take his case abroad.
One scholar notes that "the last few decades have witnessed a notable
decline in the culture of liberty-the community's shared sense that individual
privacy and dignity and freedom of speech and conscience are crucially
important... -34 The United States and every member of the European
Community are committed to the idea of democracy as witnessed by a higher
law document assuring fundamental rights and freedoms; yet Great Britain's
insistence that Parliament must have absolute legal power to do as it wishes
seems to inhibit British judges from following through with such commitment
in some cases.35
In the United Kingdom, freedoms are not regulated by an exhaustive,
documented list, so that liberty is not rights-based but rather freedom-based. 36
29 See HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 102 (Richard Gordon, QC & Richard
Wilmot-Smith, QC eds. 1996) [hereinafter Gordon & Wilmot-Smith]. The United Kingdom
granted a right of petition in 1966 that allowed citizens to enforce their rights at the European
Court of Justice. Rights were enforced by the international body by either asking Parliament to
legislate or by initiating a change in the offending administrative practice. Id.
30 Id. at 6.
1 id. at 59.
32 BOSMA, supra note 4, at 8.
33 Id.
' Gordon & Wilmot-Smith, supra note 29, at 59-60.
31 See id. at61.
36 BOSMA, supra note 4, at 4.
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The British system may seem democratic in light of Sir Robert Megarry's
description of the protection of rights in the United Kingdom: "[t]he United
Kingdom is . . . a country where everything is permitted except what is
expressly forbidden."37 Yet a stronger argument maintains that people's
liberties are indeed threatened as long as there is no entrenched constitutional
foundation to which judges can turn to bring about a desired outcome. 8
Modem judicial review, the citizen's constitutional safeguard, is absent.39
Without a written constitution, judges can only protect fundamental rights and
freedoms to the extent that general common law principles and judicial
creativity will allow.'
The system thus exposes its hypocrisies and inefficieficies by not guarantee-
ing at home in national courts those rights enforceable by citizens under
Convention law abroad in Strasbourg.4 ' The United Kingdom has one of the
highest numbers of cases brought against it before the Court of Human Rights,
with over half of the resulting violations being issued after 1990;42 this seems
to signal a need for a more committed and official adoption of the Member
States' pledge of more than half a century ago to uphold fundamental rights.
B. The Human Rights Act
1. Impetusfor the Act
Since the 1960s, members of the Houses of Commons and Lords have tried
to persuade English legislators to promote legislation incorporating the ECHR
into domestic law.43 The 1998 Human Rights bill initiates this important
reform, finally integrating the Convention into national law." The Home
Secretary described it as "the first major Bill on human rights for more than
" Michael J. Beloff, What Does it All Mean?, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998: WHAT IT
MEANS 12 (Laniny Betten ed., 1999).
" See Gordon & Wilmot-Smith, supra note 29, at 19-20.
19 Id. at 19.
0 Id.
"' See Bradshaw, supra note 25, at 58.
42 Id.
e Loveland, supra note 5, at 114.
See generally Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.); see also Bradshaw, supra note 25,
at 59. The Human Rights Act does not incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights
in its entirety; only Convention Articles 2-14 and selected Protocols are included. Id. See also
Alisdair A. Gillespie, Human Rights Act 1998: The 5 Minute Tour, available at http://jurist.law.
pitt.edu/world/ukcor3.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2002).
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300 years," and "a key component of our drive to modernize our society and
refresh our democracy. . . ."' The white paper that introduced the Act
explained its needed role in British legal culture:
[i]n this country it was long believed that the rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the Convention could be delivered under our
common law. In the last two decades, however, there has been
a growing awareness that it is not sufficient to rely on the
common law and that incorporation is necessary. In the govern-
ment's view, the approach which the UK has so far adopted...
does not reflect its importance and has not stood the test of
time.'
The HRA suggests that the government has begun promoting the development
of a culture of rights and responsibilities. 7 The HRA promises that every
citizen will be guaranteed a specific and comprehensive catalogue of
fundamental rights. 48 Thus, the Act is primarily curative of the perceived
deficiencies of the State in fulfilling their obligations to the ECHR.
2. The Act's Principal Provisions
Generally, the Act works in two principal ways.4'9 First, it requires the
courts to account for Convention precedent and interpret legislation compati-
bly with Convention rights.5" Second, it requires public authorities to act
compatibly with Convention rights unless primary legislation makes it
impossible.5
Several key features and sections of the Act are important in evaluating the
prisoner's right to procreate. First, the Convention grants signatory states a
4' Keir Starmer, Implications of the Human Rights Act, available at http://www.
doughtystreet.co.uk/data/hrights/data/hr-intro.htm (quoting Jack Straw, Home Secretary) (last
visited Jan. 10, 2002).
6Id.
41 Butler, supra note 4, at xi.
4" Id.
49 Rt. Hon. Jack Straw MP, The Human Rights Act 1998 and the European Convention on
Human Rights, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/world/ukcor3.htm (last visited Jan. 10,
2002) [hereinafter Straw on the HRA].
so Id.; see also Human Rights Act 1998, c.42 §§ 2-3 (Eng.).
s' See Human Rights Act 1998, c.42, § 6 (Eng.); see also Straw on the HRA, supra note 49.
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"margin of appreciation" as they consider the rights at issue. 2 This means that
instead of imposing rigid restrictions, incorporation of the Convention still
allows the United Kingdom to preserve cultural and political traditions, at least
to the extent that they coexist with fundamental rights and freedoms.53 This
degree of deference is necessary since many human rights issues are linked to
social conditions, attitudes and values, including family and private life."'
Courts will likely exercise a degree of discretion by assigning definitions to
these indeterminate concepts in light of the national culture and time period."
The proportionality principle, another key feature of the act, is central to
the operation of the HRA; proportionality requires the judiciary to consider
whether a restriction on human rights is legitimate and not in excess of what
is appropriate and necessary in order to fulfill the policy's purpose. 6 The
application of proportionality strives to ensure a fair balance between the
general interest of community and the protection of the individual's fundamen-
tal rights." Proportionality recognizes that while rights are important, the
pursuit of rights to the exclusion of a wider public interest may be subversive
of the ideal of a tolerant and liberal democracy."
Section 8 of the Convention, which is central to the discussion of the
prisoner's right to procreate, states generally that there shall be no interference
by a public authority with the right to respect for private and family life. 9 But
the second clause lists exceptions, such as where the interference is in
"accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the
country." In the case of a prisoner's claim that a right was violated when his
request to artificially inseminate his wife was denied, a court would ask
whether the restriction was proportionate to the prison's aims, whether the
prohibition represents a pressing social need, and whether the justifications are
52 See Loveland, supra note 5, at 113; BOsMA, supra note 4, at 132-33.
s' See generally BOSMA, supra note 4, at ch. 6.2.
5 Paul Mahoney, Principles of Judicial Review as Developed by the European Court of
Human Rights: Their Relevance in a National Context, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998: WHAT
IT MEANS 73 (Lammy Betten ed., 1999).
" See id.; see also Human Rights Website, supra note 27 (describing the Convention as a
living instrument to be interpreted in light of present day conditions).
5' BOSMA, supra note 4, at 133.
57 Id.
" Richard Clayton, Regaining a Sense of Proportion: The Human Rights Act and the
Proportionality Principle, 5 E.H.R.L.R. 504, 505 (2001).
59 ECHR, supra note 6, at art. 8(1).
I0 d. at art. 8(2).
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relevant to prison policy.6' Essentially, the application of proportionality
engages a means-end balancing test, whereby the seriousness of the restriction
is weighed against the interest in realization of the legitimate aim. 2
Section 2 of the Act is pivotal in defining the new role of the courts. It
requires the English courts to "take into account" the judgments and decisions
of the ECHR.63 This means that Convention law is not directly binding
precedent for national courts, but rather judges are only obligated to seriously
consider ECHR law." Because of the margin of appreciation, courts still
retain discretion in evaluations of fundamental rights and are thus free to
consider national principles and policies within the greater context of the
ECHR scheme. It is unclear whether this new commitment to "take into
account" ECHR judgments and resolutions will result in obligatory concur-
rence with the Strasbourg position on the prisoner's right to procreate.
Further, although the courts cannot invalidate a statute under the Act,
Section 3 states that courts are nonetheless obligated to interpret the statute in
accordance with Convention principles;65 if in a good faith effort they cannot,
a Declaration of Incompatibility may be issued." Although powerless to
nullify legislation, the authority behind the Declaration may prove to become
an important political instrument for the judiciary.67
Section 6 of the Act requires public authorities to bring their policies more
strictly in line with the ECHR." The Act does not define exactly who is
considered to be a public body,69 but the White Paper introducing the Bill
seemed to contemplate prisons when it included legal persons "exercising
functions which would otherwise be exercised by government."70  The
provision compels courts not only to review public authorities' activities when
they are a party to litigation, but also to initiate a critique of private law as
61 BoSMA, supra note 4, at 133.
/ 1d. at 142.
63 Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42, § 2(l)(a) (Eng.).
BosMA, supra note 4, at 25.
See Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42, § 3(1) (Eng.).
"Id. at sec. 4.
6' See Loveland, supra note 5, at 116 (explaining that these Declarations do not invalidate
legislation or require Parliament to take remedial action, but they are at least effective in putting
Parliamentary responsibility and human rights issues in the public eye).
68 See Human Rights Act, c. 42, § 6 (Eng.).
"Gillespie, supra note 44.
70 Roy Davis, Public Authorities and the Human Rights Act 1998, at http://jurist.
law.pitt.edu/world/ukcor3.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2002).
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well." Impliedly then, courts must scrutinize the prison policies prohibiting
conjugal visits and access to facilities for artificial insemination in order to
determine those policies' compatibility with the Convention. Courts will
decide whether prison authorities have exceeded their powers or have failed
to fulfill their duties.72 Yet, "despite the provisions in the HRA, judicial
modifications of existing policy will still largely depend on the extent to which
the courts are willing to participate in judicial review.
3. Projected Impact of Prisoners' Claims in HRA Litigation
The Human Rights Act of 1998 was expected to come into force in 1999,
but was delayed a full year due to a confidential Whitehall audit suggesting an
overwhelming multitude of laws under scrutiny.73 Officials feared an
onslaught of litigation against the government concerning, in particular, rights
to privacy and to a fair trial.7 ' Yet, one year after it came into force, the
London Times reported that, "[d]ire warnings that [the Human Rights Act]
would be a charter for crackpots and a goldmine for lawyers have proved
unfounded." 5 While there has been no inundation of prisoner claims, the
number ofjudicial reviews under HRA guidelines notably doubled as expected
in the first year of incorporation.76 One year after the Act's incorporation, the
Scotsman reported: 'The [ECHR] has been used and abused on several
occasions since it was incorporated into UK law. The sheer audacity of some
of the claims since the [HRA] was passed has led critics to dub ECHR the
'chancers' charter." '77 The article cited prisoners who have appealed to the
Convention to change their conditions injail.7' These types of appeals indicate
71 See BOSMA, supra note 4, at 27.
71 See Beloff, supra note 37.
71 See Frances Gibb, Fears of Huge Caseload Delay Human Rights Law, TIMES (London),
May 5, 1999, at 1.
74 See id.
7s Michael Beloff, WillJudges' Creativity Conflict with Security?, TIMEs (London), Oct. 2,
2001, at 8.
76 See Clarke, supra note 15 (predicting that the number ofjudicial reviews in which ajudge
is asked to overrule a decision by a government minister will double from 300 to 600 a year);
Beloff, supra note 75 (confirming that 600 cases in which HRA issues were considered reached
the High Court and above).
" John Woodcock, 'Chancers' Charter' used to aid murder'sfight, SCOTsMAN, Oct. 2,
200 1, at 9.
' See id. The article cites a prisoner who appealed to the ECHR to be paid in cash rather
than vouchers for his work in prison as a printer, arguably opening up the floodgates for
[Vol. 31:459
PROCREATING FROM PRISON
that prisoners are an influential group who are helping to shape the new human
rights culture.
C. Prisoners' Historical Requests for Artificial Insemination
British judicial policy regarding prisoners' requests to procreate behind
bars before the Act's incorporation of the ECHR is a helpful beginning point
in consideration of how, if at all, that privilege could now be asserted as a
right. A survey of prisoners' claims filed in the United Kingdom and then
taken to Strasbourg reveals inconsistent and wavering attitudes of British
prisons and British courts on the matter. Yet what is clear is that, historically,
the prisoner's right to procreate was considered neither absolute nor fundamen-
tal.
Prison regulations are one source of legal authority which have traditionally
limited the prisoner's right to procreate. The Prison Rules of 1999'9 supple-
mented the Prison Act 1952.' According to the Prison Rules, the Secretary of
State promulgates rules for the management of prisons and for the treatment,
discipline, and control of the detainees." Requests and complaints are made
to the Governor or the Board of Visitors,"2 but the Secretary of State is
ultimately responsible for policies. The Rules are not explicit about a
prisoner's conjugal rights or about other means of procreation, like artificial
insemination or in vitro fertilization, and the Secretary of State retains
considerable discretion over these matters as a result." Just as prison officials
may extend visiting privileges, they may also restrict them by prohibiting
either a particular visitor or the visit duration, so long as it is both necessary
and proportionate to the stated objectives." Conjugal visits, therefore, are not
a right but a very narrowly conferred privilege.
Beyond these regulations, the right to procreate is also guided by the United
Kingdom's commitment to the ECHR. Procreative opportunities were
addressed in Hamer v. United Kingdom" when the European Commission of
prisoners to push for employment rights. Id. It also cites a prisoner who claims being made to
"slop out" is a cruel and unusual punishment under ECHR Article 3. Id.
79 Prison Rules (1999) SI 1999/728.
80 Prison Act 1952, c. 52 (Eng.).
sI Prison Rules (1999) SI 1999/728.
I Id. atpt. II, r. 11(1).
See id. at r. 35(2)(b) (permitting the Secretary to restrict prisoners to one visit a month).
u Id. at pt. IV, r. 73(1).
" Hamer v. United Kingdom, 4 Eu. H.R. REP. 139 (1982).
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Human Rights" confirmed that Convention Article 12, the Right to Found a
Family, guaranteed the right to marry as an absolute right. 7 In Hamer, the
court also noted that "[the right to found a family] does not mean that a person
must at all times be given the actual possibility to procreate his descendants." 8
Conjugal rights were revisited once more in a case where the United
Kingdom was a party before the European Commission on Human Rights; in
1997, a prisoner and his wife requested conjugal visits to follow up pre-
conviction efforts to conceive with fertility treatments. 9 After their request
was denied by the prison, the applicants took their case to Strasbourg, claiming
an unjustified interference with their right to privacy under Article 8.' The
prohibition was upheld because the court found the prison policy proportionate
to prison objectives.9
Thus, ECHR case authority governing both the United Kingdom's and the
European Court's interpretation of Convention Articles establish judicial
concurrence that conjugal rights are not necessary to comply with Convention
principles. Whether a growing domestic liberalization of European human
rights law will encourage or obligate English judges to rethink this policy will
be discussed shortly.
Currently, the right to procreate behind bars via artificial insemination is
not an established right, but has been recognized within very narrow and
unclear circumstances.' Prisons have granted permission based on medical
necessity,93 but also denied it under the same compelling conditions.9 English
courts have upheld denials in national courts and then granted permission once
the United Kingdom was named a participating respondent in Strasbourg.95
"Human Rights Website, supra note 27 (clarifying that Protocol I I ofthe ECHR abolished
the European Commission of Human Rights; the Convention is now administered by the
European Court of Human Rights and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe).
87 Hamer, 4 EUl. H.R. REP. 139.
88 Id. at 140 (citing X v. F.R.G., 4 Y.B. Eul. CoNV. ON H.R. 240 (1961)).
89 E.L.H. & P.B.H. v. United Kingdom, at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc (App. No.
32094/96 and 32568/96) (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
90 Id.
91 Id.
9 See supra note 16 and accompanying text; see also supra note 18 and accompanying text.
9 See P.G. v. United Kingdom, at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc (App. No. 10822/84
(1987)) (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
" See R.J. & W.J. v. United Kingdom, at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc (App. No.
20004/92 (1993)) (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
" See G.S., R.S. v. United Kingdom, athttp://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc (App. No. 17142/90
(1991)) (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
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Clearly, Great Britain believes this privilege should be granted only in
exceptional circumstances, but has wrestled to define their human rights
obligations in the face of this issue.
M. THE MELLOR CASE
The recent case of Gavin Mellor offers the most insightful perspective as
to how the right of a prisoner to procreate is developing in light of the ECHR's
incorporation into domestic law. Mellor applied through the prison system for
permission to have access to facilities for artificial insemination." After the
request was denied, he took his case to the High Court in July 2000, just three
months before the Act's incorporation of the Convention, and thejudge upheld
the Secretary of State's denial." On appeal from the Queen's Bench Division,
the Court of Appeal considered and dismissed his complaint in April of 2001,
six months after incorporation.98 The opinion is enlightening because it goes
to great lengths to balance domestic laws and precedent, Convention principles
and Strasbourg jurisprudence, while striking the appropriate compromise that
is true to national traditions and to Great Britain's ECHR commitment. The
Mellor case is seminal because it reflects the current legal and cultural
approach to the prisoner's right to procreate by artificial insemination;
moreover, it provides a window into the development of the right at issue in
light of new human rights legislation.
Mr. Mellor was twenty nine years old serving a life sentence for murder
when he met and subsequently married a prison official in 1997." They
immediately applied for permission to artificially conceive by insemination.00
The couple claimed no exceptional circumstances that would normally qualify
them for assistance with this procedure; because Mellor's wife had no
medically pressing conditions, such as fertility problems or high-risk age, she
and Mellor could attempt to procreate naturally upon his release.' The
couple simply argued that they were in love, anxious to have a child, and that
R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, exparte Mellor, [2000] H.R.L.R. 846 at para. 9,
available at 2000 WL 1027083.
Id. at paras. 14, 55.
R. v. Sec'y for the Home Dep't exparte Mellor, [2001 ] H.R.L.R. 38 at para. 69, available
at 2001 WL 272920.
I' d. at paras. 3-5.
t® d. at para. 10.
0 d. at paras. 12-14; see also id. at para. 3 (explaining that the tariff element of Mr. Mellor's
life sentence is due to expire in 2006).
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Mrs. Mellor was fit to assume the responsibilities of motherhood since she
worked and had live-in help from Mr. Mellor's mother."°2
A. Consideration of Societal Values and the ECHR
The Mellor opinion indicates that both before and after the ECHR became
law, the courts have remained expressly concerned with social values.
Because Section 6 of the Human Rights Act makes courts responsible for
ensuring that public authorities, like prisons, act in accordance with Conven-
tion principles,' °3 the Act consequently requires courts to critique legislation
like the prison policy at issue in Mellor."°4 It is in this evaluation that social
values emerge.
The Mellor court noted that the Prison Service developed a set of
considerations-as opposed to rigid criteria-to guide officials' decisions, and
that while usually only medical necessity will qualify a prisoner for permission
to procreate, there are also other factors that carry weight in the decision.' °5
Whether both parties want the procedure, whether the couple is in a stable
relationship before imprisonment, the stability of the couple's domestic
circumstances, and the public's best interest are among those factors
enumerated."'6 The court justified these additional considerations by recalling
that an inevitable consequence of imprisonment is the loss of opportunity to
beget children, and that single parent families often disadvantage both the child
and society. °7 In the Mellor case, the courts were primarily concerned with
the stability of the couple's recently consummated marriage and the risks and
dangers of Mrs. Mellor's single parenting situation."0 8
Mellor's appeal claimed that it was inappropriate for the Secretary to
consider the strength of the marital relationship and the best interests of a child
with a father in prison.'O To the contrary the prisoner argued that the
Secretary should only evaluate the request in light of prison policy objectives
'o Id. at para. 10.
103 See Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42, § 6 (Eng.).
1o See BOSMA, supra note 4, at 26.
"o Exparte Mellor, 2001 WL 272920, at paras. 17(3)(a-f).
106 Id.
'¢ Id. at paras. 17(5)(a-c).
'o' See id. at paras. 17(6) and 17(12).
Io d. at para. 63; see also Steve Foster, The Prisoner's Right to Family Life, at http://www.




to maintain security and discipline." The High Court disagreed, asserting that
the Secretary appropriately formulated a policy governing access to the facility
for artificial reproduction, and the factors considered by him were both lawful
and relevant."' The Court of Appeals agreed that the Secretary of State
legitimately considered public perceptions and the consequences of single-
family parenting." ' The Mellor case therefore suggests that it is still both
appropriate and desirable for the courts to account for social values as they
step into their new roles and responsibilities under the HRA.
B. Application of Domestic Legal Principles under ECHR
In addition to considering prison policy, the British courts must also
consider other applicable domestic law principles. The Mellor opinions
expound on the United Kingdom's domestic case law guidance as to prisoners'
liberties. Citing a 1999 case, the 2000 Mellor Court stated:
[a] sentence of imprisonment is intended to restrict the rights and
freedoms of a prisoner. Thus the prisoner's liberty, personal
autonomy, as well as his freedom of movement and association
are limited. On the other hand, it is well established that a
convicted prisoner, in spite of his imprisonment, retains all civil
rights which are taken away not expressly or by necessary
implication."3
This sweeping statement suggests an underlying legal presumption that liberty
exists unless it is expressly removed. Thus, judicial evaluation of human rights
turns on the court's interpretation of what rights have been or should be
'necessarily' or 'impliedly' removed.
C. Application of ECHR Articles in Mellor
In the 2001 Mellor case, the court found no major tension between
domestic law and ECHR dictates, as Lord Philips recognized when he said,
"o R. v. Sec'y for the Home Dep't Ex parte Mellor, [2000] H.R.L.R. 846 at para. 18,
available at 2000 WL 1027083.
1" Exparte Mellor, 2001 WL 272920, at para. 66.
112 Id.
"' Exparte Mellor, 2000 WL 1027083, at para. 17(iv) (citing Raymond v. Honey, A.C. 1,
lOG (1983)).
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"the approach under Strasbourgjurisprudence and under English domestic law
is the same."" 4  Both the Queen's Bench Division and the High Court
evaluated the legitimacy of the English prison policy in light of Convention
Articles 12 and 8.' The policy allows assistance for prisoners to artificially
reproduce only in exceptional (medical) circumstances and assumes that
denying the right to procreate is a fair and necessary consequence of
incarceration." 6 Yet Article 8 protects the right to respect for private and
family life," 7 and Article 12 assures the right to found a family."' Can the
policy and the articles be reconciled?
Addressing Article 12, the Mellor court maintained that because this right
does not include the right to procreate at all times," 9 Article 12 fails to provide
legal support to the prisoner's argument. 20 The court distinguished the right
to marry from the right to conceive, because marrying is not incompatible with
a prisoner's deprivation of liberty since it only confers a status, whereas the
right to conceive can potentially threaten prison security or public interest.12'
The court emphasized that a purpose of imprisonment is to punish by depriving
prisoners of certain rights and pleasures," and since it requires the positive
assistance of the Prison Service to effectuate procreation under Article 12; "3
since the right can still be enjoyed either in exceptional circumstances or after
the prison sentence is completed, the court seemed satisfied that Article 12 has
been upheld. 1
24
Likewise, the Mellor court ultimately found the policy prohibiting AI to be
a justified interference under Article 8(2).'" In other words, the court found
that under the HRA, it is permissible for the State (i.e. the Prison Service) to
interfere with the right to private and family life because the policy meets the
stipulations set out by the Act for qualified rights:126 the limitation is
".. Exparte Mellor, 2001 WL 272920, para. 58.
"t Id. at para. 20; exparte Mellor, 2000 WL 1027083, at para. 17(vXa-b).
..6 Exparte Mellor, 2001 WL 272920, at paras. 12-14, 62 (a).
117 ECHR, supra note 6, at art. 8.
" Id. at art. 12.
... Ex pane Mellor, 2001 WL 272920, at paras. 26(ii), 30-33 (citing Hamer v. United
Kingdom, 4 EUR. H.R. REP. 139 (1979)).
20 Id. at para. 32.
121 Id.
", Id. at para. 41.
In Id. at para. 33.
124 Id. at paras. 36 and 39.
125 ECH, supra note 6, at art. 8; exparte Mellor, 2001 WL 272920, at paras. 36 and 39.
1,6 See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
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prescribed by law (the Prison policy); it pursues a legitimate aim (Article 8(2)
lists national security, public safety, prevention of crime and disorder,
protection of morals or rights of others, etc.); and the limitation is necessary
in a democratic society.'27 For these reasons, the court found the policy to be
proportionate to the prison's objectives and therefore justified. This view does
not seem to have changed upon assumption of a new judicial role under the
HRA.
The Mellor court supplemented their decision concerning AI with a
discussion of conjugal rights in the context of the right to conceive. "2 It noted
that the Commission considers the policy of prohibiting sexual relations of
married couples in prison justified for the prevention of disorder in prison."29
Prison security and good order would be seriously endangered if married
prisoners were allowed to maintain their conjugal life in the prison. 130
Conjugal visits would require that prison authorities renounce their right to
constant supervision, and uncontrolled visits could facilitate smuggling or
illegal exchanges. 3' The court concluded that the prohibition of conjugal
visits is justified under Article 8(2).32 Again, British judicial perspectives on
prisoners' reproductive freedoms seem to have changed little from pre- to post-
incorporation of the Convention.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Mellor case sends the message that, at least as it concerns the
prisoner's right to procreate by AI, incorporation of the ECHR has not
significantly altered the United Kingdom's understanding of its obligations to
uphold the right to found a family and to respect private and family life. Yet,
since incorporation, English courts have ruled on several landmark prisoners'
rights cases' and exhibited a heightened awareness of their new human rights
17 ECHR, supra note 6, at art. 8.
2 See exparte Mellor, 2001 WL 272920, at para. 27.
129 Id.
,30 Id. at paras. 36 and 63.
'Id. at para. 27.
3 Id. at para. 39.
. See, e.g., R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, exparte Mahmood [2001] 1 W.L.R.
840 (holding that substantial justification is required of executive decision makers who restrict
fundamental rights); R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, exparte Daly [2001] 2 W.L.R.
1622 (striking down prison cell-searching policy in so far as it excludes prisoners from being
present when staff examines their legal correspondence); R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home
Dep't, exparte P & Q [2001] 1 W.L.R. 2002 (holding prison policy that babies born to mothers
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obligations. In a 2001 opinion in a prisoner's rights case, the House of Lords
proffered its perspective of the court's role in this time of transition:
[i]n this instance, therefore, the common law and the convention
yield the same result. But this need not always be so. In Smith
and Grady v. United Kingdom..., the European Court held that
the orthodox domestic approach of the English courts had not
given the applicants an effective remedy... because the thresh-
old of review had been set too high. Now, following the incorpo-
ration of the Convention... domestic courts must themselves
form a judgment whether a convention right has been
breached.., and... grant an effective remedy.'
It appears that the judiciary is conscientiously participating in and shaping a
new human rights culture in the United Kingdom. The question remains,
however, as to whether the country's new role in protecting human rights
obligates Great Britain to extend procreative freedoms to prisoners, despite the
conclusions drawn by the 2001 Mellor court.
A. Should Conjugal Visits Be Revisited?
Generally, prisoners' rights to conjugal visits falls outside the realm of
rights that the United Kingdom usually grants prisoners.'35 Firstly, the United
Kingdom has a strong tradition of prohibiting them" s and secondly, conjugal
rights pose a more imminent threat to security and discipline, which would
in prison must be taken out of the prison after eighteen months must be reformed for more
flexibility, accounting for the child's welfare and in the name of legitimate and proportionate
objectives under Article 8); R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, exparte Pearson [2001]
H.R.L.R. 39 (upholding disenfranchisement of prisoners because the legislature has discretion
to qualify the right, although the restriction should be pursuant to legitimate aims); R. v. Sec'y
of State for the Home Dep't, ex parte Carroll [2001] H.R.L.R. 34 (upholding prison's squat
search policy only where reasonable grounds of suspicion exist and where there is a compelling
necessity); R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, exparte Sinms [2000] 2 A.C. 115 (holding
prisoners have the right to interview with journalists); R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't,
exparte Alconbury [2001] 2 W.L.R. 1389 (establishing an acceptablejudicial practice of setting
aside administrators' decisions if they "fail to take account of matters relevant to [the] decision
[or] reach a perverse decision").
' Exparte Daly, [2001] 2 W.L.R. 1622, at par. 23.




more easily qualify as ajustified interference under HRA Article 8. This is not
to suggest that challenges to the restriction will not take place or that the policy
will never change, but at least in this current, cautious and evolving human
rights culture, it seems unlikely. Thus, this analysis will focus on the United
Kingdom's approach to the right to procreate via Al.
B. Convention Articles Considered
Articles 8 and 12 of the Convention are the crucial provisions implicated
in discussions about family life and privacy. Article 8 grants a qualified right,
meaning it is set out in positive form but is subject to a limitation or restriction
clause that makes the right conditioned on certain circumstances. 37 The
operation of the limitation is critical in the execution of Convention rights
because restrictions can only be justified according to strict standards. 3 a Both
articles will be considered in light of the Mellor court's reasoning.
1. Article 12
The Mellor court rather quickly assessed Article 12, concluding it does not
require the prison to assist Mellor with an Al procedure. The Court recalled
case law establishing that the right to marry does not mean the right to
procreate at any time, 39 and that a limitationjustified under Article 8 could not
also be a violation of Article 12."4° Furthermore, since the European
Commission has expressly supported prohibition of conjugal visits,'4 ' the
United Kingdom is assured that their prison policy upholds Convention
principles. In fact, the High Court in Mellor qualified the right to marry as
merely acquiring a legal status, saying simply, "[ilt is for [the Mellors] to
' See Starmer, supra note 45 (categorizing rights under the HRA as absolute rights (those
that cannot be restricted in any circumstances), limited rights (rights which are derogable, but
otherwise not to be balanced against public interest), and qualified rights (like the articles at
issue).
"" See id.; see also Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (1979) 2 E.H.R.R. 245; Silver v. U.K.
5 E.H.R.R. 523 (1983).
139 R. v. Sec'y for the Home Dep't exparte Mellor, [2001] 3 W.L.R. 533, [2001] H.R.L.R.
38, at para. 32 (citing Hamer v. United Kingdom, 4 EuR. H.R. REP. 139 (1982)).
"4 See id. at para. 28 (citing X and Y v. Switz. (1978) 13 D.R. 105 (husband and wife
prisoners denied conjugal rights)).
14' SeeE.L.H&P.B.H. v. United Kingdom, [1997] 91AD.R. 61 (recognizing the importance
that prisoners keep and develop family ties in preparation for their return to the community, but
lamenting reform movements of European countries that facilitate conjugal visits).
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decide whether or not they wish to enter such an association in circumstances
where they cannot cohabit."1 42 Thus, the Mellor court seemed quite comfort-
able with the notion that Article 12 imposes no obligations to secure procre-
ative opportunities for prisoners.
It is worth probing beyond the Mellor court's application of Article 12 to
seek other possible meanings of that Article within the United Kingdom's
evolving human rights context. Notably, the Mellor court was not concerned
with whether the prison policy's stated objectives of crime prevention and
public interest are truly proportional to the gravity of the restriction that
inhibits prisoners from having children. It is significant that procreative
freedom for prisoners has mostly been considered in the context of conjugal
visits that more clearly pose the problems with which the prison policy is
concerned. But there is also an argument that the simple collection and
delivery of semen to a reproduction facility for AI poses little, if any, threat to
security" 3 (assuming the procedure is monitored). Consequently, it seems the
restriction on AI procedures could or should not be justified as easily as
prohibitions of conjugal rights under Article 8(2).'" Perhaps the court should
more rigorously scrutinize the means the policy employs to achieve its end.
Furthermore, there is room for argument that the English courts are not
capitalizing on the power of Section 6 of the HRA to secure human rights.
That section declares it unlawful for public authorities (e.g. the prisons) to act
incompatibly with the Convention." 5 Because the Secretary has discretion to
formulate his policy regarding prisoner procreation,'" 6 the courts could more
rigorously scrutinize the justification for the interference in light of the
policy's goals. Under the current scheme, as long as the Secretary is afforded
discretion, the executive remains entitled to define the policy's parameters. 47
Unless and until procreation in prisons becomes a fundamental right, the
Secretary of State has only to formulate prison policy and identify objectives
that conceivably support its restrictions.
Contrary to the arguments that the United Kingdom should assume more
responsibility in enforcing rights, the European Court has itself stated that
Article 12 is mainly concerned with protecting marriage as the basis of the
142 Exparte Mellor, 2001 WL 272920, at para. 32.
I4 d. at para. 40 (argument of Mr. Pannick, Q.C., lawyer for Mr. Mellor).
'"See Foster, supra note 109.
,, Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42, § 6(1) (Eng.).




family.'14  The Court has also found that the stability of marriage is a
legitimate aim because it is in the public interest.' While the right to found
a family is absolute, procreation does not necessarily follow as an equally
protected corollary of that right.' An emphasis on the importance of stable
marriages in British society and the clear delineations between the right to
marry and to procreate will strengthen the validity of the current prison policy
within the human rights context.
2. Article 8 and Proportionality
There is considerable uncertainty among contracting states and within the
European human rightsjudiciary as to how to apply Article 8.11' The provision
requires courts to identify one of four interests to which each person is
entitled."2 The duty "to respect" implies a duty to protect the individual from
arbitrary interference. "3 After establishing the existence of a duty, "the State
and the individual stand in rough equality [and] the court must seek a 'fair
balance' between the interests... of the individual and the community as a
whole.""'
Developing sound jurisprudence for the concept of proportionality is the
most difficult, but also the most important problem facing the English courts
under the HRA.'" Applied to the procreation issue, courts are challenged to
weigh the interests of the prisoner who wants to father a child against the
interests of society, including national security, the prevention of disorder and
crime, and the protection of morals and of freedoms of others." The Mellor
court's decision to uphold the restriction takes the position that the policy is
"' Penny Booth, Correspondents' Reports: Family Law and the Human Rights Act 1998,
available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/world/ukcor3.htm (citing Rees v. United Kingdom (1986)
9 E.H.R.R. 56) (last visited Jan. 10, 2002).
149 Id.
15o Id.
..' Colin Warbrick, The Structure ofArticle 8, 1 E.H.R.L.R. 32 (1998) (stating that there has
been criticism within the court itself about lack of legal certainty arising out of Article 8
judgments, including incoherence and arbitrariness).
15' ECHR, supra note 6, at art. 8 (1). Requiring respect for the "duty" to respect private and
family life, home and correspondence. Id. See also Warbrick, supra note 151, at 34.
's Warbrick, supra note 151, at 34-35.
"Id. at 35.
= See id.
"' ECHR, supra note 6, at art. 8(2) (specifying reasons which wouldjustify interference with
privacy).
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proportional to the aims pursued by the government, and that the interests of
Mr. Mellor in fathering a child through Al while in prison do not outweigh the
perceived dangers that prisoner reproduction presents.
Article 8 readily lends itself to the three-part test used by many English
courts to ensure that restrictions are adequately justified. First, the limitation
in question must be prescribed by law.' Second, the restriction must pursue
a legitimate aim.'58 Finally, the limitation must be necessary in a democratic
society. 9
The Mellor court did not use this test per se, but it addressed many of the
principles implicit in the test.'" The prison policy meets the first prong of the
test requiring the limitation in question to be prescribed by law. Under the
Prison Act, the Secretary of State retains discretion to make rules for the
management of prisons, including discipline, treatment, and control of the
detainees.1 6' The regulation meets other requirements of prescribed law: 62 (1)
it is adequately accessible, since prisoners can facilitate the process through
application to the governor, and (2) it is sufficiently precise so as to enable the
prisoner to regulate his conduct accordingly. 63
Under the second prong, the policy pursues the aims listed in the article,
namely security, crime prevention, and the protection of morality and rights of
others. The third requirement under the test is that the restriction be necessary
in a democratic society. One human rights scholar argues that while the word
'necessary' is not synonymous with 'indispensable', it is also not as flexible
as 'reasonable' or 'desirable'.'" But it seems the English courts have
interpreted the phrase simply to mean "proportionate to the legitimate aim,' 65
which is a more flexible application. This more general formula does not
necessarily lower the standard of necessity. However, the standard calls for
1'7 Starmer, supra note 45. For other applications of this requirement, see also Hendricks v.
Neth. (1983) 5 E.H.R.R. 223; Andersson v. Swed. (1992) 14 E.H.R.R. 615; Johanssen v. Nor.,
(1996) 23 E.H.R.. 33.
Is$ Starmer, supra note 45. See also Olssen v. Swed. (No. 1) (1988) 11 E.H.R.R. 259
(articulating language about the legitimacy of objectives).
1s9 Starmer, supra note 45.
60 See generally R v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, exparte Mellor [2001] H.R.L.R.
38, available at 2001 WL 272920.
"I1 Prison Act 1952, c. 52 (Eng.), at s. 47.
112 Starmer, supra note 45.
163 Id.
164 Id.
65 See Beloff, supra note 37, at 44.
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interpretation'" and the words acquire their meaning when placed in the
context of the circumstances.'67 Even more importantly, provisions do not take
on a static definition, but rather evolve with time.'68 Therefore, as the United
Kingdom develops its human rights culture and begins to assign specific values
to rights and freedoms guaranteed under the HRA, the level of 'necessity'
required to justify a limitation will become clearer.
Whether this indicates that the United Kingdom's application of propor-
tionality in the Mellor case squares with that of Strasbourg jurisprudence is
unclear, however. Since the HRA was passed, several cases reviewing the
decision-making of government executives have suggested that the United
Kingdom has not consistently been committed to an adequately strict standard
of review. Particularly, in R. (Mahmood) v. Home Secretary,69 the court of
appeal reviewed whether the decision-maker's determination was reasonable
and afforded the executive such a measure of deference that readily justified
interferences with privacy rights. 7 ' Yet in other cases,'' a much stricter
application of proportionality was applied in Strasbourg. In one example, the
court heavily criticized the Ministry of Defence's justification for its policy,
which was contrary to Article 13." Another case7 3 followed the same
approach, finding that the Secretary of State's policy requiring prisoners to be
absent while their cells were searched could not be fairly justified under
Article 8.''
Thus, English courts have applied proportionality with varying rigor. One
ECHR scholar urged that, "perhaps it is unrealistic to expect too great a degree
'" See Paul Mahoney, Principles of Judicial Review as Developed by the European Court
of Human Rights: Their Relevance in a National Context, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998:
WHAT IT MEANs 67 (Lammy Betten ed., 1999).
167 Id. at 68.
'i Id. at 73.
169 R. v. Sec'y for the Home Dep't, exparte Mahmood, [2001] 1 W.L.R. 840 (upholding
Secretary of State's decision that applicant did not acquire leave to remain in the United
Kingdom after marrying British citizen, nor after applicant became a father to the couple's child).
170 See Clayton, supra note 58, at 508-09; see also, e.g., R. v. Sec'y for the Home Dep't, ex
parte Samaroo (C.A., 17 July 2001 [unreported]) (holding similarly that Secretary of State's
decision to make deportation order fell within his discretionary area of judgment and could
evaluate what was necessary in a democratic society).
'71 See, e.g., Smith & Grady v. U.K., (1999) 29 E.H.R.R. 493 (finding nonetheless that the
policy met the criteria expected of an executive decision-maker).
"' Id. (arguing high standard of review effectively excluded the possibility of finding the
aims were not proportionate to the restriction).
'73 R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, exparte Daly, [2001] 2 W.L.R. 1622.
174 See id.
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of coherence or too consistent an outcome of cases in what is still an
international experiment."' 75 Yet overall, British courts have more frequently
applied a rigorous standard for proportionality, and the Mellor court arguably
meets those standards.
C. Does The United Kingdom have an Affirmative Duty to Promote Private
and Family Life?
This analysis has examined whether the United Kingdom has adequately
protected private and family life as required by the Convention. Yet another
argument might postulate that contracting states have a duty not only to
protect, but also to promote those values. Overall, the Convention imposes a
set of negative obligations on the States, dictating what they may not do. 7 '
The duty not to interfere with respect for private and family life in Article 8 is
such an example. Thus, a literal interpretation of this article would not require
states to secure the rights they protect. But some human rights scholars argue
otherwise,' and, furthermore, certain provisions in both EU legislation and
in British prison policy' may suggest that such a duty is inherent in the spirit
of the Act.
A belief that the HRA is an opportunity to effect changes in the protection
of human rights on a grand scale suggests that the State can be the catalyst for
that change. For example, Francesca Klug, who sees the HRA as representa-
tive of history's "third wave" bill of rights, argues that "the State has a major
proactive role in modern human rights thinking, even to the point of interfering
between private relationships where necessary."'7 Penny Booth argues that
part of balancing competing interests (between individual interests and
society's needs) in Article 8 includes the courts' obligation to define the
'" Warbrick, supra note 151, at 34.
,' See Jonathan Herring, The Welfare Principle in Family Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE
NEW MIaLENNIUM 145 (Frances Butler ed., 2000).
'"See infra notes 179-180 and accompanying text.
78 See infra notes 181-183 and accompanying text.
179 Francesca Klug, The Human Rights Act-A "Third Way" or "Third Wave" Bill ofRights,
[2001] 4 E.H.R.R. 361,371. Klug posits a theory of three waves of rights that represent the key
phases in the evolution of human rights concepts, including the Enlightenment, the post-Second
World War period and now a new post-Cold War Era. She argues the Human Rights Act
exemplifies the third wave. Id.
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boundaries between the state's duty not to interfere and the obligation to
secure measures to promote respect for family life." °
Moreover, a viable argument remains that applicable human rights law also
calls for a more liberal interpretation of the State's duty to effect human rights
guarantees, especially in the prison context. For example, in 1999, the
European Union published its Resolution on Improvements and Alternative
Penalties for Prison Conditions.' The resolution stresses:
[the firm belief] that prisoners' families in particular should be
taken into account ...by ensuring that wherever possible
prisoners are held in a place close to the homes of their families
and by encouraging family and conjugal visits with special areas
set aside for this purpose, given that spouses and children always
play an extremely positive role in helping prisoners change their
ways...18
The United Kingdom's Prison Rules also contain a provision obligating the
State, via prison officials, to effect stable private and family life for prisoners.
One rule states that "special attention shall be paid to the maintenance of such
relationships between a prisoner and his family," and that prisoners "shall be
encouraged and assisted to establish and maintain such relations."'8
Charging the State with obligations to 'ensure,' 'encourage' and 'assist'
paints a potentially paternalistic view of the State in its role in the emerging
human rights culture. This idea was put forth by the European Court even
before the HRA was in force:
[a]lthough the object of Article 8 is essentially that of protecting
the individual against arbitrary interference by public authorities,
it does not merely compel the state to abstain.., there may, in
addition to this primary negative undertaking, be positive
obligations inherent in an effective respect for private or family
life. These obligations may involve the adoption of measures
designed to secure respect for private life. . .
180 Booth, supra note 148.
,8? Resolution on Prison Conditions in the European Union: Improvements and Alternative
Realities, 1999 OJ. (c 98) 299.
2 Id. at par. 2 (emphasis added).
2 Prison Rules (1999) SI 1999/728 at pt. II, r.4 (emphasis added).
"' Stubbings v. U.K., (1997) 1 B.H.R.C. 316.
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While this perspective finds some support in the interpretations and legal
documents discussed, British courts are not presently approaching their human
rights obligations in that light.
V. APPROACHES TO PROCREATIVE FREEDOMS FOR PRISONERS: THE
UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES COMPARED
There are two compelling reasons to survey the United States' approach to
the prisoner's right to procreate and pinpoint the commonalities between the
two Anglo systems. First, it is of interesting coincidence that a prisoner in
each country petitioned for the doctrinally unfounded right to procreate by AI
to the Appeals Court level within five months of each other. In both cultures,
prisoners' rights, and especially procreative rights, are hotly contested areas
of constitutional uncertainty. 8 5
Second, a look at the U.S. approach may provide insight into the develop-
ment of the prisoner's right to procreate in the United Kingdom. In
transitioning to a rights-based human rights system, the United Kingdom
designs its own constitutionally protected rights and experiments with judicial
review through the HRA. The United States subscribes to a written, rights-
based Constitution enforced by the power ofjudicial review.' 6 Both countries
evaluate the right at issue in light of privacy rights and under the standard
proscribed by each country for reviewing infringements on prisoners' rights.'
Though the prisoners in both countries were denied their petitions, it is still
compelling to examine the courts' approaches.
American prisoner William Gerber is serving a 111-year sentence in
California.'88 Like British prisoner Gavin Mellor, he has no conjugal rights,189
which explains why he and his almost 50-year old wife pursued the opportu-
nity to conceive by AV"' Just as Strasbourg jurisprudence has not yet
definitively shaped prisoners' procreation rights, neither has the U.S. Supreme
Court taken a position on the parameters of that right for prisoners.
lBS See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
's See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803) (establishing the
doctrine ofjudicial review under the Constitution).
"" Compare, e.g., exparte Mellor, [2001] 3 W.L.R. 533, [2001] H.R.L.R. 38, available at
2001 WL 272920, with Gerber v. Hickman, 264 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd en banc, 291
F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 558 (2002).





Prior to Gerber, the Eighth Circuit, considering the issue for the first time
in 1990, struck down a prisoner's claim that his Constitutional rights were
violated when his request for assistance with AI was denied. "I The Goodwin
court found that the prison regulation was valid as reasonably related to
furthering the legitimate penological interest of treating male and female
inmates equally."'"
In 2001, the Ninth Circuit considered the issue again in Gerber and
disagreed, asserting that the right to procreate does survive incarceration and
the policy does not qualify as a legitimate objective; 93 the court found that it
is impermissible to restrict the constitutional rights of one group for fear that
another would then assert its constitutionally protected rights, 9' and therefore,
this explanation did not provide the requisite justification for the prison
regulation. The Ninth Circuit court focused on past Supreme Court endorse-
ments of the fundamental right to procreate.' Contrary to the Goodwin case,
the 2001 Gerber court recognized prisoner procreation as a fundamental right
and remanded the case for further inquiry into more legitimate reasons to
restrict the right. ' It was on remand that the Ninth Circuit ultimately reversed
its holding. 197
Two important similarities between the countries' approaches become
evident. First, like the United Kingdom's domestic law principle that prisoners
retain liberties not expressly removed,98 the appeals court recalled Supreme
Court notions that "no iron curtain separates prisoners from the
Constitution,""9 such that "they retain those rights not inconsistent with their
"' Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1990).
192 Id. at 1401.
193 See Gerber v. Hickman, 264 F.3d at 891 (9th Cir. 2001).
1% Id.
" 9 Id. at 892. The Court here gave examples of Supreme Court cases supporting a general,
fundamental right to procreate, including: "[i]t is clear that among the decisions that an
individual may make without unjustified government interference are personal decisions 'relating
to marriage... [and] procreation' (citing Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85
(1977)), as well as "[the rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed
'essential'... [and] 'basic civil rights of man' (citing Stanley v. Ill., 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
Id.
9 Id. at 892-93.
'17 See Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617(9th Cir, 2002). Upon the vote of a majority of non-
recused, regular, active judges of the court, it was ordered that this case be reheard en banc. The
court declared that the right to procreate in prison is not conferred as a right by the U.S.
Constitution. Id.
"9 Raymond v. Honey (1983) A.C. 1, 10G.
99 Gerber, 264 F.3d at 887 (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984)).
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status as prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the
corrections system."2
Second, the notion of weighing the legitimacy of the policy justifications
against the severity of the restriction is a method applied on both sides of the
Atlantic. As noted, the HRA calls on English judges to apply proportionality
and engage in a means-end balancing test between the competing interests of
the state and the petitioner.2"'
In the United States, a standard articulated in Turner v. Safely2 is
applicable, setting a standard of review for infringements on prisoners'
substantive due process rights.20 3 The Turner court promulgated a reasonable-
ness standard whereby a connection between the regulation and the objective
is required and the availability of an alternative is highly desirable.2 ' In both
cases, the courts' approach is to balance the merits of a means against the
consequences of its end.
In evaluating the prisoner's request, the 2001 Gerber court considered other
case law indirectly addressing the issue and the authority of the 14th
Amendment. In terms of case law, Supreme Court precedent, like ECHR
precedent, acted only as a guide for the judges in both the Gerber and Mellor
cases. Strasbourg law recognized the right to found a family and the right to
respect for private life under the ECHR, but applicable case law established
only that marriage does not mean the right to procreate at all times20 and that
only exceptional circumstances legitimated the procedure for prisoners. 20,
Similarly, while the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a fundamental
constitutional right to procreate, ' 7 neither it nor any federal appeals court has
decided whether inmates have the right to procreate while incarcerated.2 8
Just as the ECHR acts as supranational law for the United Kingdom under
the HRA, so does the Constitution provide the ultimate authority for issues of
human rights protection in the United States. The Supreme Court has
2' Id. (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)).
2o See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
202 482 U.S. 78 (1997).
2o See Kristin Davis, Inmates and Artificial Insemination: A New Perspective on Prisoners'
Residual Right to Procreate, 44 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMW. L. 163, 167-68 (1993).
204 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90.
20 Hamer v. U.K., 4 EUR. H.R. REP. 139 (1982).
o See supra notes 16, 101 and accompanying text.
See Gerber v. Hickman, 264 F.3d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 2001).
See Jennifer L. Reichert, The Right to Procreate Survives Incarceration, Ninth Circuit
Rules, 37 TRIAL 76 (2001).
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consistently recognized a liberty interest in the privacy guaranteed by the 14th
Amendment.2' Included are personal choices concerning marriage,"'0
procreation,"' contraception," 2 child rearing," 3 and abortion.2 4 Gerber
asserted that his 14th Amendment rights2"5 had been violated because
California denied him his fundamental right to procreate in violation of the
Constitutional guarantee of substantive due process. 2 6 The court's approach
was that if the right to procreate is found to survive incarceration, then the 14th
Amendment would require that restrictions on that right be related to prison
system objectives and be sufficiently legitimate to justify the infringement.2"7
In fact, the court initially found that the right survived in prison and that the
objective of equal treatment of males and females was not legitimate, but then
reversed its holding on rehearing.2 8
The general analysis employed by the courts in each country is arguably
more alike than different. In fact, legal analysts quickly predicted the 2001
U.S. ruling in Gerber would be overturned, given the unusually liberal
leanings of the Ninth Circuit concerning prisoners' rights.21 9 Ultimately, the
209 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (affirming a'rightofpersonal privacy,
or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy").
210 Loving v. Va., 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding unconstitutional a statute that prohibited
interracial marriages).
2 Skinner v. Okla., 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (invalidating a statute that permitted
sterilization of inmates convicted of felonies involving moral turpitude).
2 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (holding that the constitutional right of
privacy includes an individual's decision whether or not to use contraceptives).
"I Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,534-35 (1925) (according parents a privacy right
in deciding whether their children should attend public or private school).
214 Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
215 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
216 Gerber v. Hickman, 264 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 2001).
217 Id. (explaining that a two step analysis requires the Court to first determine whether there
-is a fundamental right involved and whether that fundamental right is not inconsistent with
[Gerber's] status as a prisoner, and second, to ask whether there are legitimate penological
interests that justify the restriction of that fundamental right).
211 See supra notes 191-97 and accompanying text.
219 Analysis: US. 9th Circuit Court ofAppeals Rules on Inmates' Right to Procreate, NPR:
WEEKEND ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 8, 2001) (quoting Professor
Charles Whitebread of the University of Southern California, that in "virtually every single rights
of prisoners case heard by the United States Supreme Court over the last decade, the prisoners'
rights claim has been rejected"); see also Greg Krikorian, Judges Back Procreation by Inmates
Courts, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6,2001, at Al (noting that the Ninth Circuit has a record of producing
liberal decisions on prisoners' rights issues that have been overturned by the Supreme Court).
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ruling was reversed, although not by the Supreme Court. Undoubtedly, the
initial ruling had evoked hostile reactions from those who passionately
disagreed that the U.S. Constitution offered any such guarantees.220 If these
reactions and the subsequent ruling reversal are indicative of a Supreme Court
ruling, then arguably neither rights-based system embraces the prisoners' right
to procreate at will by artificial insemination.
Regardless of what the prisoners' procreation cases in each country indicate
about current attitudes toward private and family life, the two countries share
a very fundamental and important similarity in their political structures. The
Convention, like the U.S. Constitution, represents an attempt to fashion a type
of democracy based on a broad consensus, on principles that cut across party
politics as well as historical and geographical frontiers.22' While the new law
does not permit judicial review on the same scale as the United States, where
legislation can actually be invalidated, 21 English courts' steps toward review
of the merits of executive policies and the power of the Declaration of
Incompatibility nonetheless underscores the same principles of democratic
liberalism. Incorporation of the ECHR, viewed in this light, is a highly
ambitious and potentially very powerful instrument with which to shape and
secure a strong human rights regime, much in the way the U.S. Constitution
shapes rights for its citizens.
VI. CONCLUSION
Several factors will influence the evolution of the prisoner's right to
procreate in the United Kingdom's new human rights culture. First, the
scrutiny with which courts will review public authorities' policies for
consistency with the Convention will be of pivotal importance. Secondly,
220 See Greg Krikorian, State Fights Procreation for Prison Inmates Courts, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 13,2001, at B I (citing the California Attorney General's motion for appeal that the ruling
"has cast the lower courts into hopeless conflict, created a right that is unprecedented under
Supreme Court case law, and triggered ramifications that will far exceed the bounds of this
case"); see also Bob Egelko, Court OKs Remote Fatherhood for Inmates, SAN FRAN. CHRON.,
Sept. 6, 2001 at A3 (quoting the frustrations of California Deputy Attorney General Gregory
Walston toward the ruling allowing an inmate who will never be a father to create a child,
exclaiming, "[i]s that what prisons are for?"); Greg Krikorian Court Says Jails Can't DenyRight
to Procreate, SEATrLE TIMES, Sept. 6, 2001, at A7 (quoting Ron Zumbrun, former president of
the Pacific Legal Foundation, inquiring "[i]f you are having lifetime criminals furthering their
genes, is that in the best interests of society?").
,,1 Loveland, supra note 5, at 119.
22 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).
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evolving notions of privacy and family values provide a background against
which courts can measure the intrusiveness of the restriction. But the
development of these ideas will only be instrumental if the judges are willing
to step into their new role and apply what the Convention requires of them.
As one scholar has predicted: "[w]e can expect to see a much more
pronounced 'rights consciousness' such as exists in the USA government, in
the legislature, in the media and among the public at large. This is likely to
lead to an increasingly powerful and prominent role for the senior judi-
ciary.. .. " The 2601 Mellor court, the only court to consider a prisoner's
petition for access to Al facilities after incorporation of the ECHR, conditioned
its denial to the prisoner on the particular circumstances of the case, suggesting
the possibility of a different outcome under different facts:
[i]t is not obvious that the signatories to the Convention would
have agreed that a man who had, by imprisonment, been justifi-
ably deprived of the enjoyment of family life and the exercise of
conjugal rights, should be entitled to inseminate his wife
artificially... it does not follow from this that it will always be
justifiable to prevent a prisoner from inseminating his wife
artificially, or indeed naturally. The interference with fundamen-
tal rights... involves an exercise in proportionality. Exceptional
circumstances may require the normal consequence of imprison-
ment to yield, because the effect of its interference with a
particular human right is disproportionate.'
While an appreciation of the development of a human rights culture is crucial
to an understanding of how prisoners rights will be treated in the future, it
seems clear nonetheless that the prisoner's right to procreate by either conjugal
visits or artificial insemination is not required for compliance with the ECHR.
Article 8, which accords individuals respect for private and family life, and
Article 12, which protects the right to found a family, are the two Convention
rights implicated when a prisoner asserts a right to procreate behind bars.
Before the Human Rights Act incorporated the ECHR into domestic law,
neither Article had been interpreted by the Strasbourg courts to require prison
authorities to allow access to facilities to procreate by conjugal visits or Al.
2 Loveland, supra note 5, at 126.
R. v. Sec'y for the Home Dep't exparte Mellor, available at 2001 WL 272920 [2001]
H.R.L.R. 38, at paras. 43, 45.
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Under the new Act, British courts still refuse to view their human rights
obligations as so extensive that prisoners should retain the freedom to
procreate while incarcerated.
The essence of the United Kingdom's position is the belief that prisoners
should be granted civil rights to the extent that they preserve the purpose and
status of incarceration. Furthermore, valid justifications must be put forth to
permit infringements on prisoners' liberties. So, while the right to found a
family includes an absolute right to marry, it does not encompass an absolute
right to procreate. The right to respect for private life does not inhibit the
Secretary of State in designing prison policies that prohibit prisoners from
procreating by AI when the reasons are legitimately tied to important
penological objectives. The United Kingdom recognizes the importance of
protecting, but not promoting or facilitating, private family life or the founding
of a family when it conflicts with restrictions on prisoners that are proportion-
ate to the aims pursued by the executive.
The 2001 Mellor case illustrates the persistence of the United Kingdom's
traditional approach to this issue as evidenced by the High Court's denial of
the right to procreate by Al to a lifetime prisoner. Despite the denial, however,
the Mellor court demonstrates a veritable commitment to upholding their new
obligations under the HRA, and a heightened awareness of the burgeoning
rights-based legal culture. The denial of permission to inmate Mellor does not
signify a breach of the United Kingdom's pledge under the HRA, but rather a
cautious and thorough evaluation of their own historical and legal traditions,
as well as a fair understanding of the obligations underlying the Act.
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